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A SOLUTION TO THE STUDENT LOAN CRISIS:
HUMAN CAPITAL CONTRACTS
On August 22, 2013, President Barack Obama recognized that “[w]e’ve
got a crisis in terms of college affordability and student debt.”1 The student
loan crisis is characterized by the fact that over 38 million students are
burdened by outstanding student loans, amounting to over $1.1 trillion.2
The current student loan crisis remains a prominent fixture in national
discussion, and in response, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB) released a report examining the scope and the nature of the student
loan market. 3 According to the report, the student loan market was
approaching $1.2 trillion,4 approximately $1 trillion of which was made up
of federal student loans.5 The report also indicated that student loan debt
grew 20% between the end of 2011 and May 2013, and that student loans
“comprise[d] the second largest form of consumer debt behind home
mortgages.”6 The student loan market’s “lack of repayment options and
flexibility in times of distress,”7 has been a significant factor in bringing
about the student loan crisis. Although regulators and policymakers
encourage market participants to develop alternative student debt repayment
options, “consumers continue to encounter limited or no flexibility when
seeking help from their lender or servicer.”8
1. Michael O’Brien, Obama Targets ‘Crisis’ in College Costs as Part of Middle-Class Push,
NBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2013, 12:51 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/other/obama-targets-
crisis-college-costs-part-middle-class-push-f6C10974393. As of February 2015, the student loan
market amounts to over $1.3 trillion. See Ashley Tate, Hacking Away at Student Loan Debt, USA
TODAY (Feb. 16, 2015, 9:55 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2015/02/16/ozy-student-loan-
debt/23491057/.
2. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STUDENT LOAN AFFORDABILITY: ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC
INPUT ON IMPACT AND SOLUTIONS 5 (2013) [hereinafter CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
STUDENT LOAN AFFORDABILITY], available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201305_cfpb_rfi-report_student-loans.pdf.
3. Rohit Chopra, Student Debt Swells, Federal Loans Now Top a Trillion, CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU (July 17, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/student-debt-swells-
federal-loans-now-top-a-trillion/.
4. Id.
5. Id. However, the $1.2 trillion figure does not include student funds that could otherwise
contribute towards retirement savings, parent borrowing, or credit card debt. See Chris Denhart,
How the $1.2 Trillion College Debt Crisis is Crippling Students, Parents and the Economy,
FORBES (Aug. 7, 2013, 12:30 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/specialfeatures/2013/08/07/how-
the-college-debt-is-crippling-students-parents-and-the-economy/.
6. Chopra, supra note 3.
7. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB STUDENT LOAN
OMBUDSMAN 2 (2014), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201410_cfpb_report_annual-report-of-the-student-loan-
ombudsman.pdf. Many complaints indicate that borrowers sought to negotiate a modified
repayment plan during a period of financial distress; however, because lenders and servicers
provided no options, borrowers defaulted. These complaints closely mirror problems found in the
mortgage servicing market, as large numbers of homeowners sought to avoid foreclosure.
8. Id. at 2–3.
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This Note proposes a novel financing scheme, characterized by private
equity investments in higher education, as a solution to the student loan
crisis.9 As first proposed by economist Milton Friedman, human capital
contracts are financial instruments with which students can receive private
capital to fund their educational pursuits in exchange for a certain
percentage of their future earnings. 10 Income-contingent human capital
contracts provide for an economically preferable higher education financing
scheme because they allow for price determination, flexibility, and greater
access to the higher education sector.11 Part I of this Note examines the
current federal and private student loan models, and considers the
implications of their inability to adequately provide higher education
financing to students. Part II introduces the concept of equity investments in
higher education financing through human capital contracts, and
demonstrates why the adoption of such a scheme serves as a more
economically preferable financing model. Part III illustrates the advantages
of income-contingent financing schemes by considering current financing
platforms and models that employ equity investments in human capital.
Finally, Part IV addresses the challenges faced by, and the implications of,
adopting a higher education financing model that uses human capital
contracts. While the enforcement of a higher education financing scheme
that employs equity investments in human capital gives rise to legal and
social implications, it provides a more economically sound student lending
market, as well as a more transparent higher education market.12
9. Miguel Palacios, Equity Financing for Human Capital, 1 BATTEN BRIEFINGS, Autumn
2002, available at
http://www.ncspe.org/publications_files/Equity%20Financing%20for%20Human%20Capital.pdf.
10. Id.
11. Gary Neil Marks, The Social Effects of the Australian Higher Education Contribution
Scheme (HECS), 57 HIGHER EDU. 71 (2008).
12. The value of higher education is well documented. Holding a bachelor’s degree is
correlated with a median lifetime income of $2.8 million (84% greater than that of an individual
with a high school diploma). Moreover, the unemployment rate for individuals with a degree is
significantly lower than for those without (4.5% for individuals with a B.A. compared to 8.3% for
those with a high school diploma). For individuals between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four,
“those with only a high school diploma are more than three times as likely to be unemployed as
those with a bachelor’s degree.” Degree-holders also experience smaller declines in wages, are
more likely to have health and retirement benefits, and are reportedly more satisfied with their
careers and personal lives. INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS& SUCCESS, ALIGNING THEMEANS AND THE
ENDS: HOW TO IMPROVE FEDERAL STUDENT AID AND INCREASE COLLEGE ACCESS AND
SUCCESS 10 (2013), available at
http://ticas.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/pub/TICAS_RADD_White_Paper.pdf;
GEORGETOWN UNIV. CENTER ON EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE, THE COLLEGE PAYOFF:
EDUCATION, OCCUPATIONS, LIFETIME EARNINGS 1 (2011), available at
https://cew.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/collegepayoff-complete.pdf.
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I. CURRENT STUDENT LOAN MODEL
Since 2002, government funding for higher education has declined by
almost 25%, while tuition and fees at four-year public institutions have
increased by 5.2% annually–2.4% for private four-year institutions–over the
same period, after adjusting for inflation. 13 Between 2013 and 2014,
approximately 60% of undergraduate students enrolled in public and private
institutions graduated with debt.14 According to a recent survey, the average
student borrower will graduate with debt of $26,600.15 As tuition costs and
the number of student debtors continue to increase, it is apparent that the
current student loan model—comprised of the federal student loan program
as well as the private lending market—fails to provide adequate higher
education financing.
A. FEDERAL STUDENT LOANMODEL
Currently, federal student aid, in the form of grants, loans, and tax
credits,16 constitutes over two-thirds of all student aid to undergraduate and
graduate students.17 In order to receive any federal aid, applicants must
complete the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) form,18
available through the Department of Education. The Department of
Education processes the FAFSA form to calculate the Expected Family
Contribution (EFC), which represents “the amount that [a] student and [his
or her] family are expected to cover directly from their income, assets or
other sources, including loans.”19 Schools award federal aid in an amount
13. INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS& SUCCESS, supra note 12, at 11.
14. COLLEGEBOARD, TRENDS IN STUDENT AID 2014 4 (2014), available at
http://trends.collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/2014-trends-student-aid-final-web.pdf. In
comparison, in 1993, only half of all graduates bore student loans. See INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS
& SUCCESS, supra note 12, at 15. For a survey of current tuition costs and associated fees, see
Average Published Undergraduate Charges by Sector, 2014-15, COLLEGEBOARD,
http://trends.collegeboard.org/college-pricing/figures-tables/average-published-undergraduate-
charges-sector-2014-15 (last visited Feb. 13, 2015).
15. Denhart, supra note 5.
16. Federal higher education tax benefits, through the tax code, have failed to effectively
supplant federal student aid. Students and their families only receive tax benefits long after they
have incurred student debt. Additionally, federal tax benefits disproportionately accrue to upper-
middle and higher income families. Finally, receiving higher education tax credits is complex and
difficult to ascertain.
It takes the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) eighty-seven pages to explain them all and
how they do and do not interact. A recent Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report to Congress found that over half of all tax filers likely eligible for a higher
education benefit failed to claim one at all or chose a less optimal benefit than they
were qualified for.
INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS& SUCCESS, supra note 12, at 17–18.
17. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, PRIVATE STUDENT LOANS 9 (2012), available at
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201207_cfpb_Reports_Private-Student-Loans.pdf.
18. Id. at 10.
19. Id.
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that reflects the difference between a student’s cost of attendance20 and the
student’s estimated EFC..21 Traditionally, private student loans were used to
finance the EFC, along with loan products available through the
Department of Education, including the PLUS Loan, the Grad PLUS Loan,
and the unsubsidized Stafford Loan.22 In order to be eligible to receive
PLUS loans, students must not have an adverse credit history and must be
pursuing a graduate or professional degree.23 Stafford loans are available in
subsidized and unsubsidized forms.24 The Department of Education pays
the interest on subsidized loans for students who demonstrate financial need,
while students are responsible for paying the interest on unsubsidized loans,
for which a showing of financial need is not required.25
Federal student loans may be repaid according to various repayment
plans. 26 One repayment option is the Income-Based Repayment (IBR)
plan. 27 In order to qualify for this payment schedule, students must
demonstrate a financial hardship. 28 Under the IBR plan, the payment
amount is adjusted annually to reflect projected income and family size.29
Generally, a monthly payment of 15% of a student’s income will be due, for
no more than twenty-five years, in order to satisfy the loan amount plus
interest.30 Moreover, any remaining loan balance not paid within twenty-
five years of the commencement of the repayment period will be
discharged.31 Students who are employed by a public service organization
may receive loan forgiveness after ten years through the Public Service
Loan Forgiveness Program.32 Federal student loans may also be subject to
rehabilitation options for borrowers in default.33
Although the federal student loan program provides more than one
repayment option, it has been described as “too complex . . . too arbitrary,
and . . . poorly targeted.” 34 The complexity of the federal student aid
20. Id. In calculating a student’s cost of attendance, the school considers “tuition, fees, books
and other program charges, together with expected costs for food and housing, transportation, and
other necessary expenses of the school year.” Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. PLUS Loans, U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/plus#am-i-
eligible-for (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
24. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 17, at 10.
25. Id.
26. U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., supra note 23.
27. Income-Driven Plans, U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-
loans/understand/plans/income-based (last visited Jan. 30, 2014).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 reduced the cap on annual
income-based repayments for students after July 1, 2014 and provided for loan forgiveness on the
remaining balance of student loans after twenty years. Id.
32. Id.
33. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STUDENT LOANAFFORDABILITY, supra note 2, at 5.
34. INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS& SUCCESS, supra note 12, at 6.
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process undermines students’ ability to secure adequate financing. For
instance, the FAFSA form is almost as convoluted and lengthy as the full
1040 tax form.35 In addition, students are not made aware of the amount of
their federal aid eligibility until after they complete the college application
process. As a result, the federal loan program is poorly oriented because it
deters many students from applying to otherwise well-suited institutions.36
B. PRIVATE STUDENT LOANMARKET
The private student loan market consists of three types of lenders: (1)
financial institutions, (2) non-profit lenders, and (3) schools that choose to
fund or guarantee student loans.37 According to the CFPB, private student
loan debt amounts to approximately $165 billion.38 Unlike federal loans,
private student loans do not offer students flexible repayment options.39
Due to the unavailability of flexible refinancing options, many students are
dissuaded from taking out private loans altogether, despite the fact that
interest rates are at a historic low.40 Nevertheless, the private student loan
market has the potential to provide students with adequate financing. In fact,
“[f]ueled by investor appetite for asset-backed securities, the financial
institution private student loan market grew from less than $5 billion in
2001 to over $20 billion in 2008, before contracting to less than $6 billion
in 2011.”41
According to the CFPB, the lack of flexible repayment options in
private financing presents many problems. Students who take out private
loans suffer from damaged credit, thereby undermining their ability to
rectify indebtedness. 42 The CFPB also states that there is well over
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id. Nevertheless,
[s]ubsidized Stafford Loans currently provide students with particularly valuable
benefits, including a low fixed interest rate and no interest accrual while the student is
in school. However, these benefits are not well targeted, as high-income students may
qualify just because they attend a high-cost college. In addition, eight in ten students
with subsidized loans also have unsubsidized loans, diluting the subsidy’s benefits. In
July, the subsidized loan’s interest rate is scheduled to double from 3.4 percent to 6.8
percent, while interest rates on 10-year Treasury notes are currently two percent.
Reform is clearly and urgently needed. Our loan recommendations aim to better support
access and success while containing costs and risks for both students and taxpayers.
Id. at 6.
37. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 17, at 9. For a thorough analysis of the private
student loan market, see CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, MID-YEAR UPDATE ON STUDENT LOAN
COMPLAINTS (2014), available at http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201404_cfpb_midyear-
report_private-student-loans-2014.pdf.
38. Chopra, supra note 3.
39. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 17, at 12–13.
40. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STUDENT LOANAFFORDABILITY, supra note 2, at 5.
41. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 17, at 3.
42. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, STUDENT LOANAFFORDABILITY, supra note 2, at 3.
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$8 billion in defaulted student loan debt, and even more debt in
delinquency.43 The CFPB has identified six major economic and social
effects of high student debt burdens. First, student debt limits borrowers’
ability to take on new financial obligations, ultimately hurting the nation’s
economic health. 44 This notion is illustrated by the fact that younger
consumers are less likely than ever to enter the housing market.45 According
to the National Association of Home Builders, high student loan debt
affects borrowers’ creditworthiness with regard to mortgage origination,
which hinders their ability to successfully finance homes.46 Second, rising
student debt has impacted American entrepreneurship and small business
formation, by deterring young people from assuming the risks associated
with starting new businesses. 47 Specifically, satisfying student debt
payments prevents young people from investing capital into new
businesses.48 Although income-based repayment options allow students to
divert their available capital to the formation of new businesses, these
repayment options are not available to borrowers who take out private
student loans.49 Third, increasingly high student loan debt poses a risk to
national retirement security.50 Fourth, according to the American Medical
Association, high student loan debt deters medical students from pursuing
practice areas that appear less lucrative than other specialized areas, leading
to an expected critical loss in primary care physicians.51 Fifth, unlike federal
student loans, private student loans do not offer forgiveness repayment
options, which deter borrowers from pursuing teaching and other public
interest positions.52 Finally, the CFPB reported that the burden of high
student debt impedes the development of rural areas.53 The inability of
student debtors to move to rural areas discourages economic growth and
inhibits the development of a professional community within these areas.54
In response to these rising concerns, the CFPB encouraged policymakers to
propose alternative loan modification and refinance mechanisms,
particularly within the private student loan market.55
43. Id. at 5.
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id. In fact, from 2007 to 2011, the number of Americans between the ages of twenty-five
and thirty-four living with their parents has increased by more than 1.3 million. See id. at 8.
46. Id. at 8.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 8–9.
50. Id. at 9.
51. Id. at 9–10.
52. Id. at 10.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 5–6.
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In spite of the historic rate of student indebtedness, the availability of
federal grants and other alternatives to federal student aid decreases.56 The
collapse of credit markets has hampered students’ abilities to acquire
private loans, while limited government funding and private endowments to
academic institutions has necessitated many universities to increase tuition
costs.57 As a result, student debt increases, as does the risk associated with
student-loan default.58 To avoid accumulating massive debt obligations and
the risk of default, many students choose to forgo college altogether.59 With
higher education costs on the rise and access to student aid on the decline, a
new model of higher education financing is necessary.
In an attempt to rectify the failing student loan model, President Obama
proposed new legislation addressing the federal Stafford loan interest rate.60
On August 1, 2013, Congress passed the Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty
Act of 2013. 61 In amending the Higher Education Act of 1965, the
Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act fixes the interest rate for federal
Stafford loans based on the high yield of the ten-year Treasury note plus a
specified percentage.62 While the new legislation may temporarily halt the
rapid decline of the student loan market, many commentators note that the
legislation fails to adequately address the real problems plaguing the current
student loan scheme. 63 Moreover, as one commentator observed,
“[c]onstraints on the federal budget will limit the options of [President]
Obama and [] Congress, regardless of their plans to aid students.”64 The
government’s failure to properly modify the federal student loan scheme
necessitates higher education financing reform in the private student loan
market. 65 While the foregoing examination of the student loan crisis is
limited in scope, and many additional factors have contributed to the nature
of the student loan market,66 the primary focus of this Note is an alternative
scheme to finance higher education in the private capital market.
56. R. Paul Guerre, Financial Aid in Higher Education: What’s Wrong, Who’s Being Hurt,
What’s Being Done, 17 J.C. & U.L. 483, 483 (1991).
57. Rebecca Tuhus-Dubrow, Betting on Bob, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 30, 2008),
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2008/11/30/betting_on_bob/.
58. Guerre, supra note 56, at 483–84.
59. Id. at 484.
60. Peter J. Reilly, News Flash to Obama On Student Loans: It Is Not The Interest Rates...It Is
The Sticker Price, FORBES (Apr. 26, 2012, 9:03 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2012/04/26/news-flash-to-obama-on-student-loans-it-is-
not-the-interest-rates-it-is-the-sticker-price/.
61. Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty Act of 2013, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1087e(b) (West 2015).
62. Id.
63. Reilly, supra note 60.
64. Tuhus-Dubrow, supra note 57.
65. Anya Kamenetz, Obama Should Push Bankruptcy Relief for Student Loans, CNN (Apr. 26,
2012, 7:42 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/04/26/opinion/kamenetz-obama-higher-
education/index.html.
66. As one commentator succinctly identified,
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II. HUMAN CAPITAL CONTRACTS: INVESTING PRIVATE
CAPITAL IN HIGHER EDUCATION
In Capitalism and Freedom, American economist Milton Friedman
analyzes the role of the government in education.67 According to Friedman,
occupational and professional schooling “is a form of investment in human
capital precisely analogous to investment in machinery, buildings, or other
forms of non-human capital.”68 For Friedman, higher education constitutes
investment in human capital because it increases the economic productivity
of an individual.69 Friedman suggests that the pursuit of higher education,
as an investment in human capital, yields a higher rate of return on
investment than the rate of return on investment on physical capital.70 By
pursuing higher education, an individual invests in his or her human capital,
and can expect returns in the form of higher earning potential.71 Thus, “[t]he
the federal student-aid program, however, constitutes only one element of several
causally related adverse developments: (1) a decade of college-tuition increases that
outpaced inflation; (2) changes in the federal-tax laws that increased the costs of
financing a postsecondary education for both students and schools; and (3) a shift in
emphasis of federal-aid policy from grants to loans. These developments have created
an environment in which financing a college education represents a formidable, if not
impossible, task. Faced with spiraling tuition rates, federal grants whose purchasing
power has eroded, and the prospect of mounting debt burdens upon graduation, students
are enrolling in lower-cost institutions, dropping out of college, or for- going college
altogether. Although the financial-aid crisis has touched students of all socioeconomic
classes, it has affected low-income and minority students most severely.
Guerre, supra note 56, at 484.
67. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 86 (1962).
68. Id.
69. Id. According to Friedman, higher education is a form of investment in human capital
because it increases the productivity of the individual, and in doing so,
the individual is rewarded in a free enterprise society by receiving a higher return for
his services than he would otherwise be able to command. This difference in return is
the economic incentive to invest capital whether in the form of a machine or a human
being. In both cases, extra returns must be balanced against the costs of acquiring them.
Id.
70. Id. Friedman asserts that
[i]f capital were as readily available for investment in human beings as for investment
in physical assets, whether through the market or through direct investment by the
individuals concerned, or their parents or benefactors, the rate of return on capital
would tend to be roughly equal in the two fields. If it were higher on non-human capital,
parents would have incentive to buy such capital for their children instead of investing a
corresponding sum in vocational training, and conversely. In fact, however, there is
considerable empirical evidence that the rate of return on investment in training is very
much higher than the rate of return on investment on physical capital. This difference
suggests the existence of underinvestment in human capital.
Id.
71. Miguel Palacios, Human Capital Contracts, POLICYANALYSIS No. 462, Dec. 16, 2002, at
2, available at http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/human-capital-contracts-equity-
instruments-financing-higher-education.
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term ‘human capital’ conveys the concept that an individual’s knowledge
and skills are assets.” 72 As investment in higher education offers
considerable returns, capital holders should be incentivized to invest in
human capital.73 However, because human capital cannot be marketed and
acquired or sold through the use of traditional financial instruments, the
capital market underinvests in human capital.74
The underinvestment in human capital may be attributable to the
distinctions between physical and human capital. Unlike physical capital,
human capital, specifically in the form of investment in education, has not
traditionally been valued. 75 The value of an investment in a student’s
education is wholly dependent on the student’s performance, the chosen
academic institution, and the field of study. Furthermore, in contrast to
physical capital, human capital is not liquid. Investment in human capital is
illiquid because an individual may not pledge all or a part of his or her self
as collateral for the investment.76 As such, investment in human capital
faces the risk of uncertainty. 77 The underinvestment in human capital,
prevents the flow of sufficient private capital to higher education
financing.78
Accordingly, Friedman suggests a framework within which an
individual may sell a share of his or her earning potential in order to receive
capital to finance that individual’s education. In return, the individual
receiving private capital agrees to pay the financing individual or entity a
specific share of his or her future earnings.79 Through diversification of risk,
the success of an investment in education as to one student compensates for
the risk or loss associated with the investment in education as to another
student. While investment in human capital presents risk and loss potential,
the opportunity to claim a stake in the profits of such an investment should
encourage capital financing.80 A financial instrument that allows for the
flow of private capital to finance higher education, in return for a share in
the success or failure of the human investment, would serve the interests of
students and investors alike. The transfer of risk from the student to the
investor, through investing in human capital, is economically superior to the
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 86–87. According to Friedman, “[t]his underinvestment in
human capital presumably reflects an imperfection in the capital market. Investment in human
beings cannot be financed on the same terms or with the same ease as investment in physical
capital.” Id.
75. Id.
76. Palacios, supra note 71, at 3.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 87.
80. Palacios, supra note 71, at 3.
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transfer of risk in traditional student loans, particularly subsidized federal
loans, in which risk of investment is transferred to the taxpayer.81
The agreement described by Friedman, between a student seeking
financing and a capital-holding investor, has been characterized as a
“human capital contract.” 82 According to Miguel Palacios, an Assistant
Professor of Finance at Vanderbilt University’s Owen Graduate School of
Management, the use of this novel financial instrument will revolutionize
the current student loan model. 83 According to Palacios, human capital
contracts are “equity-like” financial instruments.84 Because human capital
contracts allow for private financing and income-contingent repayment,
these financial instruments are better suited than traditional student loans to
aid students in financing higher education.85 In fact, human capital contracts
are not loans, but rather have been described as providing “students with a
form of career insurance.”86
The adoption of human capital financing in higher education would
resolve many of the problems the current student loan model presents. The
Institute for College Access and Success87 recently identified four failures
of the current student loan model, which account for rapidly growing gaps
in higher educational access and success: (1) complexity of the federal aid
application process, (2) insufficient need-based grant aid, (3) inability of
parents and students to make fully informed decisions about which
institutions to apply to and attend, and (4) failure to hold academic
institutions accountable for ensuring that their students receive high-quality
education without incurring significant debt obligations. 88 Encouraging
equity investments in financing higher education would allow for a less
complex and more accessible financing scheme, and, as detailed below,
financing higher education through human capital contracts would remedy
the additional failures identified by the Institute for College Access and
Success.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1.
83. Miguel Palacios, VANDERBILT UNIV., http://www2.owen.vanderbilt.edu/miguel.palacios/
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
84. Palacios, supra note 71, at 1.
85. Id.
86. David Bornstein, A Way to Pay for College, With Dividends, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2011,
9:43 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/02/a-way-to-pay-for-college-with-
dividends/?_r=0. According to Bornstein, “[s]tudent [sic] who opt for them will discover that their
cost of financing is lowest when they need money most, and it will be highest when they need it
least. They give up a portion of their success at the upper end for peace of mind when times get
tough.” Id.
87. The Institute for College Access and Success is an independent nonprofit organization that
supports nonpartisan research and analysis. The organization seeks to improve access to
affordable higher education through various public policy initiatives. About Us, INST. FOR COLL.
ACCESS& SUCCESS, http://www.ticas.org/about.vp.html (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
88. INST. FOR COLL. ACCESS& SUCCESS, supra note 12, at 3.
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As set forth by Palacios, under a human capital contract, a student
receives funding in exchange for a percentage of his or her income during a
fixed period of time. Human capital contracts are equity-like instruments
because the investor’s return will depend on the earnings of the student, not
on a predefined interest rate.89 Because of the nature of the agreement, risk
is transferred from the student to the investor, the party who has greater
access to information regarding the economic value of specialized
education, and who can therefore better control the risk.90 In his evaluation
of human capital contracts, Palacios adheres to Friedman’s conception that
these financial instruments promote equality of opportunity by addressing
income inequality, without having adverse effects on the capital market.91
Furthermore, financing higher education with private capital through human
capital contracts would best promote the use of human resources by
facilitating competition and providing effective incentives to secure high-
income employment.92
According to Palacios, human capital investments are characterized by
uncertain returns, are income-contingent, and allow students’ greater
financial independence than fixed loan obligations. 93 As a result, such
investments align investors’ interests with students’ interests. 94 Human
capital contracts are attractive to students and investors alike because (1)
unlike traditional student loans, they are income-contingent, and thereby
release students from making fixed loan payments and reduce uncertainty;
(2) they eliminate default caused by financial distress; (3) unlike traditional
federal student aid, they are needs blind; and (4) high-income earners
subsidize repayment by those students who are unable to meet their
repayment obligations.95
89. Palacios, supra note 71, at 1.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2. According to Friedman, investing in human capital promotes equality of
opportunity without “impeding competition, destroying incentive, and dealing with symptoms, as
would result from outright redistribution of income, but by strengthening competition, making
incentives effective, and eliminating the causes of inequality.” Id. (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 107 (1962)).
92. Friedman proposes that the adoption of human capital contracts in financing higher
education
would make capital more widely available and would thereby do much to make
equality of opportunity a reality, to diminish inequalities of income and wealth, and to
promote the full use of our human resources. And it would do so not by impeding
competition, destroying incentive, and dealing with symptoms, as would result from the
outright redistribution of income, but by strengthening competition, making incentives
effective, and eliminating the causes of inequality.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 67, at 107.
93. Palacios, supra note 71, at 4.
94. Id.
95. Id.
602 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 9
While human capital contracts reduce students’ uncertainty of
repayment, they also re-align the informational asymmetry, such that the
party bearing the greatest risk is also the party with the greatest access to
relevant information. The investor is better suited to absorb the risk
associated with investment in human capital because the investor has the
ability to diversify his or her risk among many human capital contracts,
thereby reducing the aggregate risk.96 Like most investments, investments
in human capital contracts face risk diversification.97 However, through
diversification, investors may protect against discrepancies between
expected future earnings and actual earnings, while maximizing their
probability of greater investment returns. As Friedman argues, high
incomes achieved by some graduates offset the risk of other graduates’ low-
income employment or unemployment.98 By having access to information
regarding high-income earners and low-income earners, investors will be
better equipped to determine which students to invest in and will be better
able to predict potential future earnings. Palacios argues that access to such
employment and earnings information will positively impact the higher
education market.99
In comparing earnings expectations based on various factors, including
academic institution chosen, major pursued, and other relevant factors,
students and investors will have access to information “making more
transparent the decision about what school to attend or what field to
pursue.”100 More importantly, this analysis will allow the market to assess
information about “the economic value of certain fields of study compared
to their cost.”101 The utilization of human capital contracts will improve the
higher education market by making transparent the economic costs and
benefits of attending particular academic institutions and pursuing
particular fields of study.102 As a result, academic institutions would feel
pressure to appropriately price tuition, such that it more proportionately
96. Id.
97. Marc Nerlove, Some Problems in the Use of Income-Contingent Loans for the Finance of
Higher Education, 83 J. POL. ECON. 157, 161 (1975).
98. As described by Nerlove,
high incomes achieved by some members of the group, and their higher-than-average
payments, must be used to offset low incomes earned by others and their consequently
lower-than-average payments. In examining the behavior of a prospective borrower and
his decision, one can think of him as purchasing low-income insurance at a ‘premium’
which is reflected by the conditions under which he can relieve himself of the
obligations imposed by the plan prior to the general contractual termination of his
group. The earlier those with relatively high-level income streams opt-out, the greater
will be the total repaid, including interest, by the lower-income recipients remaining.
Id.
99. Palacios, supra note 71, at 5.
100. Id.
101. Id. (emphasis omitted).
102. Id. at 5–6.
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reflects graduates’ future earnings.103 Accordingly, a new higher education
financing scheme that permits equity investments in human capital would
effectively remedy the failures of the current student loan model, by
providing a sound student lending market, price determination, flexibility,
greater access to the higher education sector, and greater transparency of the
higher education market.
III. CURRENT INCOME-CONTINGENT AND HUMAN CAPITAL
CONTRACT SCHEMES
A. STATE SPONSORED INCOME-CONTINGENT FINANCING SCHEMES
In response to the student debt crisis, alternative student loan schemes
have been proposed. 104 Those receiving the greatest support reflect an
income-contingent repayment schedule. In July 2013, the Oregon
Legislature passed House Bill 3472, setting forth a “Pay Forward Pay Back”
plan. Noting the failure of federal financial aid programs, the bill proposes a
new solution to make higher education more affordable.105 In an attempt to
rectify the state’s higher education financing scheme, the Higher Education
Coordinating Commission, Oregon Student Access Commission, Oregon
University System, and the Department of Community Colleges and
Workforce Development created a pilot program called “Pay Forward Pay
Back.”106 As set forth in the bill, students who are residents of Oregon and
who attend in-state public higher education institutions are exempt from
paying tuition or fees.107 Instead, these students must enter into a valid
contract with Oregon to pay the state or an in-state public higher education
institution a certain percentage of their annual adjusted gross income upon
graduation.108 The specific terms of the contract determine what percentage
of a student’s gross adjusted income is to be paid, as well as the number of
years over which payments are due. 109 Payments received from
participating graduates will be placed in a trust fund and will be used to
fund future students.110 This novel higher education financing scheme will
enable students to complete higher education debt free.
103. Palacios, supra note 9.
104. See Dylan Matthews, No, Oregon is Not Abolishing Tuition, WASH. POST (July 10, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/10/no-oregon-is-not-abolishing-
tuition/.
105. H.B. 3472, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013) [hereinafter Oregon Pay it Forward
Bill], available at
https://olis.leg.state.or.us/liz/2013R1/Downloads/MeasureDocument/HB3472/Enrolled.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Matthews, supra note 104.
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Commentators note that Oregon’s “Pay Forward Pay Back” plan
reflects a “social insurance program,” and that it should not be confused
with a loan.111 The program should not be characterized as a loan because
students graduate debt-free, payments are not subject to interest rates, and
payments—which reflect a certain percentage of students’ annual income—
are fixed for the entire repayment period.112 More importantly, the Oregon
program’s payment schedule should not be characterized as debt repayment.
Instead, students “go to college in a debt-free manner from Pay it Forward
contributions taking the place of tuition. Then, after [they’ve] gotten this
debt free college education, [they] contribute [themselves].”113 According to
the drafters of the bill, this novel higher education financing scheme is
necessary to remedy the student debt “emergency.”114
While Oregon’s proposed education financing program enables students
to graduate debt-free, the plan fails to address significant issues. For
example, the plan does not address whether participating students may pay
off their tuition fees in a shorter time period than that specified in the
financing agreement.115 Such a provision is important for students who earn
high post-graduation incomes, because if no buyout option is available,
these graduates might be subject to disproportionate repayment fees, as
compared to the actual cost of their education.116 Nevertheless, Oregon’s
“Pay Forward Pay Back” plan seeks to rectify the currently failing student
loan model and serves as a useful financing program to which other states,
the federal government, and private institutions might look to in order to
improve their own higher education financing models.
In 1989, Australia adopted an income-contingent repayment student
loan scheme. 117 Known as the Higher Education Contribution Scheme
(HECS), Australia’s student loan repayment program is paid through the
111. Debt-Free Higher Education, OR. WORKING FAMILIES PARTY,
http://workingfamilies.org/issues/debt-free-higher-education/.
112. Id.
113. Matthews, supra note 104. According to John Burbank, of the Economic Opportunity
Institute,
the Oregon program wouldn’t technically be a debt. [It would] just be an amount of
money that you have to pay back to someone who gave you the money in the first place.
But not a debt. ‘The difference is that the Obama administration’s programs are based
on debt,’ he says. ‘You’re paying off a debt. Pay it forward is not based on that. It’s not
a debt instrument. You get to go to college in a debt-free manner from Pay It Forward
contributions taking the place of tuition. Then, after you’ve gotten this debt free college
education, you contribute yourself.
Id.
114. Oregon Pay it Forward Bill, supra note 105.
115. Matthews, supra note 104.
116. Id.
117. Andrew Norton, Australian Plan Has Helped Students, at a Cost, N.Y. TIMES (July 11,
2013, 1:52 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/07/09/study-now-pay-
later/australian-college-plan-has-helped-students-at-a-cost.
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country’s income tax system.118 Eighty-five percent of Australian students
choose to participate in the HECS.119 When these students enroll in college,
their debt is recorded with the Australian Internal Revenue Service
(Australian IRS). 120 HECS debt is indexed annually using Australia’s
Consumer Price Index, and is interest free.121 The Australian IRS deducts
up to 8% of graduates’ annual income to repay their debt obligations.122
HECS debtors are required to begin repayment once their income reaches
the mandatory “repayment threshold,” which is adjusted annually to reflect
changes in average weekly earnings.123 Thus, if a graduate’s income does
not meet this threshold amount, or if a graduate is unemployed, no
payments are due.124 Accordingly, there are no student debt defaults in the
HECS because, “people with debts face no repayment hardships and
graduates do not have to take high income jobs in order to be able to afford
repaying their loans.”125 A demonstration of serious financial hardship can
defer the mandatory repayment schedule.126 If a graduate wishes to submit a
voluntary repayment fee, a bonus of 15% may be added to the repayment
fee.127 HECS debts not fully satisfied are forgiven at death.128 In 1991, New
Zealand adopted a similar plan to the HECS.129 South Africa, the United
Kingdom, and Hungary have also adopted similar higher education
financing schemes.130
B. PRIVATE HUMAN EQUITY INVESTMENT SCHEMES
In 2002, Miguel Palacios and business partner Felipe Vergara founded
Lumni,131 a company that “designs and manages social-investment funds
that invest in the education of diversified pools of students.”132 In exchange
for private equity financing, students agree to pay a fixed percentage of
their income for ten years after graduation. After the ten-year period, the
118. Bruce Chapman & Yael Shavit, A Better Way to Borrow, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (June 8,
2010), http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2010/06/08/chapman.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. The Higher Education Contribution Scheme, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL.,
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Pub
lications_Archive/archive/hecs (last visited Nov. 19, 2013, 1:31 PM).
122. Chapman & Shavit, supra note 118.
123. PARLIAMENT OFAUSTL., supra note 121.
124. Chapman & Shavit, supra note 118.
125. Id.
126. PARLIAMENT OFAUSTL., supra note 121.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Chapman & Shavit, supra note 118.
130. Id.
131. Our Story, LUMNI, http://www.lumniusa.net/about/our-story (last visited Nov. 19, 2013,
1:34 PM).
132. Id.
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students’ obligations are terminated, regardless of the total sum paid.133
Lumni currently offers human capital financing in Chile, Columbia, Peru,
Mexico, and the United States, and has provided higher education financing
to nearly 5,000 students.134 According to Lumni, nearly all of the students
who receive human capital financing hail from low or very-low income
families.135 Furthermore, 55% of the students who receive human capital
financing through Lumni are women, and 99% of the students are the first
in their families to attend college. 136 To price human capital contracts,
“Lumni’s analysts forecast individual students’ income curves and align
student selection and contract pricing with stated objectives for financial
and social return. Although the salary of any individual student is
impossible to predict, Lumni pools these idiosyncratic risks through a
portfolio of students.”137
One Lumni-funded student, Jairo Sneider, was raised in a low-income,
single parent household in Colombia.138 Sneider dreamt about attending
college to pursue nursing, but was unable to obtain federal student aid or a
private loan to help him afford the $8,500 tuition. 139 Lumni agreed to
provide Snieder with $8,530 in private financing in exchange for 14% of his
future earnings, for 118 months after graduation. If Sneider earns the
average salary for nurses in Colombia, his human capital contract obligation
will reflect the average interest rate in the country for student loans.140
In 2012, former Google Executive David Girouard and a group of
former Google employees founded Upstart, a company that created a
funding marketplace designed to provide people early in their careers with
financing, to enable them to start a business, learn a new skill, or pay off
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. David Bornstein, Instead of Student Loans, Investing in Futures, N.Y. TIMES (May 30,
2011, 8:25 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/30/instead-of-student-loans-
investing-in-futures/?_r=0.
137. For Potential Investors, LUMNI, http://www.lumni.net/forpotentialinvestors/ (last visited
Apr. 14, 2015, 3:35 PM). Lumni further describes its pricing scheme and notes
[o]ne guideline is that you might pay 4 to 8% of your income for 120 working months
after graduation if you need a total of $16,000 to $20,000 in financing while in college.
If your total financing is more like $4,000 to $5,000, then you would commit closer to
1% to 2% of your income for 120 months. The exact percentage will vary based on a
number of factors including the school you attend, your time until college graduation,
your grades, and your major.
FAQs, LUMNI, http://www.lumniusa.net/faqs (last visited Apr. 14, 2015, 3:35 PM). See also
Investigating Human-Capital Contracts: Companies and Alternatives, THINKLEADER (Dec. 31,
2012), http://www.thinkleader.org/2012/12/31/investigating-human-capital-contracts-companies-
and-alternatives/.
138. Bornstein, supra note 136.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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their student loans. 141 Pave, an American start-up that offers equity
financing to young individuals, operates similarly to Upstart.142 Both Pave
and Upstart provide social platforms from which investors can select and
finance candidates. 143 The terms of these arrangements are set out in
financing agreements called “Income Share Agreements,” and repayment
obligations are fixed as small percentages of future earnings.144
While these companies offer similarly structured financing
arrangements, the repayment terms and calculus of such arrangements differ.
Upstart prices its human capital agreements using a “proprietary statistical
model” to predict future earnings over a ten-year period.145 It also charges
up to 7% of the capital-receiving individual’s income, which generates, on
average, an 8% annual return to investors.146 Average Upstart financing is
$25,000, and the repayment schedule is set over a ten-year period.147 If an
individual wishes to terminate his or her repayment obligation, the
investment is converted into a loan that carries a 15% interest rate.148 Pave
allows individuals to commit up to 10% of their future earnings.149
Thrust Fund, another company that offers equity financing for human
capital, provides a platform that connects social entrepreneurs with private
capital investors.150 Through human capital contracts, Thrust Fund investors
support entrepreneurs, and in exchange, receive social and financial
dividends.151 Thrust Fund does not use an algorithmic model to price human
capital contracts, but allows the investors and entrepreneurs to agree upon
the terms of the contract themselves.152 CareerConcept is a German firm
141. About Upstart, UPSTART, https://www.upstart.com/about (last visited Feb. 28, 2015, 1:43
PM).
142. Crowdfunding Students: Start Me Up, ECONOMIST, June 15, 2013, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21579490-helping-youngsters-sell-
stakes-their-future-start-me-up.
143. Id.
144. UPSTART, supra note 141.
145. Id. The algorithmic methodology analyzes school attended, area of study, standardized test
scores, work experience, outstanding job offers, and other accomplishments. Next, this
information is entered into a statistical model that compares applicants to others with similar
credentials. Upstart’s model “is based on several public and private datasets and statistics, as well
as proprietary qualitative measures,” in order to best predict future earnings. The model allows
Upstart analysts to determine a funding rate, which is “the amount of money the upstart can raise
for each 1% of income shared.” Id.
146. Id.
147. THINKLEADER, supra note 137.
148. Id.
149. ECONOMIST, supra note 142.
150. Sarika Bansal, Thrust Funds: The Ultimate Wild Card, BEYOND PROFIT, April-June 2010,
at 36–37, available at https://sarika008.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/thrust-funds-sarika-
bansal1.pdf.
151. Id. See also Cristina Roman, Don’t Just Give . . . Invest, SOC. ENTER. ASSOCS. (Apr. 28,
2010), http://www.socialenterprise.net/blog/dont-just-give-invest.html.
152. See Kim-Mai Cutler, Entrepreneurs Offer Their Life’s Future Earnings for an Investment,
VENTURE BEAT (Mar. 3, 2010, 11:59 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2010/03/03/life-investment/;
Alex Tabarrok, Invest in People with Income Contingent Loans, MARGINAL REVOLUTION (Mar. 9,
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that provides private equity financing to students 153 by pooling private
capital in exchange for a portion of students’ future incomes.154
Financing methods utilizing human capital contracts have also been
introduced in professional sports. 155 On October 17, 2013 a start-up
company, Fantex Holdings, announced “a new trading exchange for
investors to buy and sell interests in professional athletes.”156 The company
chose Arian Foster, a National Football League (NFL) player, for its first
initial public offering.157 Participating investors were to receive shares in
Foster’s future earnings, including football contracts, endorsement deals
and appearance fees.158 Fantex offered 1.06 million shares at $10 a share,
and Foster was to receive $10 million.159 In return, Foster agreed to pay
Fantex and its investors, 20% of his future income. 160 On October 31,
Fantex secured a similar deal with another NFL star, Vernon Davis, in
which he will receive $4 million in exchange for 10% of his future
earnings.161 The recent trend in equity financing for human capital reflects
Milton Friedman’s notion that human capital is an economically valuable
asset that can generate large investment returns. As illustrated, human
capital financing schemes that provide for income-contingent repayment
options have proven successful and offer a more economically efficient
alternative to traditional student loan models.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF ENFORCING HUMAN CAPITAL
CONTRACTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCING
While the enforcement of human capital contracts faces challenges,
recognizing the validity of these novel financing arrangements would
provide a superior alternative to current public and private student loan
schemes. The first such challenge concerns the legal validity of human
2010), http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2010/03/markets-in-everything-invest-
in-people.html.
153. ECONOMIST, supra note 142.
154. Education Funding, CAREER CONCEPT, http://www.career-concept.de/en/index?siteID=37
(last visited Nov. 19, 2013, 1:59 PM).
155. See Peter Lattman & Steve Eder, Like that Athlete? Buy a Share, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18,
2013, at A1.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. Soon after its Arian Foster IPO announcement, Fantex postponed the proposed IPO
because the running back suffered a season-ending back injury. Erik Matuszewski, Fantex
Postpones Arian Foster Share Because of Back Surgery, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Nov. 13, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-11-12/fantex-postpones-arian-foster-share-sale-
because-of-back-surgery.
161. Peter Lattman, Second N.F.L. Player Signs Public Offering Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31,
2013, at B4. Currently, Fantex also offers investments in professional athletes Alshon Jeffery,
Mohamed Sanu, EJ Manuel, and Michael Brockers. Explore Stocks, FANTEX,
https://fantex.com/explore (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
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capital contracts. As noted above, many investment platforms have
successfully executed human capital contracts in higher education financing.
Nevertheless, certain state laws might prohibit the assignment of future
income, and the legal validity of human capital contracts in these states
remains uncertain. 162 Legal recognition and treatment of human capital
instruments as securities is necessary to allow financial institutions, as well
as individual investors, to freely buy and sell them.163 According to Palacios,
the “securitization of a fund allows a person to have a portion of a fund,
with the advantages of diversification, without having to invest the whole
amount of money required to gain the advantages of diversification.”164 As
such, legal recognition of human capital contracts as secured instruments
would facilitate private equity investment by individuals as well as large
financial institutions,165 making great sums of private capital available to
students.
To the author’s knowledge, no settled case law exists as to the
enforceability of human capital contracts, and “[t]he issue of contract
enforceability will only be determined with certainty when one of these
contracts is challenged in court and a favorable ruling is obtained, or when
human capital contracts are recognized in every state or at the federal
level.”166 However, on April 5, 2012, President Obama signed into law the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act).167 Title III of the JOBS
Act, named the CROWDFUND Act, provides for a regulatory structure in
which startups and small business can raise capital through equity
crowdfunding portals.168 Pursuant to the CROWDFUND Act, transactions
involving the sale or offer of securities up to $1 million are exempted from
the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933. 169 The
crowdfunding provisions of the JOBS Act were designed to enable
“startups and small businesses with capital by making relatively low dollar
offerings of securities less costly,” and to “permit Internet-based platforms
to facilitate the offer and sale of securities without having to register with
the [Securities Exchange] Commission as brokers.”170 Compliance with the
provisions of the CROWDFUND Act would allow equity financing
platforms to serve as intermediaries as means to facilitate the offer and sale
of human capital instruments to finance higher education. In addition to the
potential protection afforded to education financing under the JOBS Act, as
162. Palacios, supra note 71, at 8.
163. Id. at 8–9.
164. Id. at 7.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 8.
167. H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
112hr3606enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr3606enr.pdf.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9470, 78 Fed. Reg. 66428 (Nov. 5, 2013).
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Palacios suggests, human capital contracts ought to be afforded the same
legal protection given to traditional student financing. 171 For example,
current student borrowers may not discharge their loan obligations to
lenders for seven years after graduation, even if they have filed for
bankruptcy.172 Similarly, investors in human capital contracts should be
protected from the possibility of students disavowing their obligations by
declaring bankruptcy.173
The second challenge facing the enforcement of human capital contract
financing is the likening of the contractual arrangement to indentured
servitude.174 Those opposed to the enforceability of human capital contracts
argue that allowing an individual to sell his or her own income is akin to
slavery or indentured servitude.175 However, “the fundamental difference is
that with slavery or indentured servitude the master has authority over what
the slave or servant does. The essential element is lack of free will, not
ownership of earnings.” 176 A human capital contract obligation simply
assigns to the financing party a right to a portion of the student’s future
earnings. In addition, human capital contracts contain a “buyout clause[s],”
as well as provisions allowing for contract modification. 177 As such,
executed human capital contracts should not be subject to indentured
servitude charges. 178 In fact, as one commentator observed, the current
higher education lending model deprives students of their freedom of
opportunity, by restricting their potential career options to only those
careers that will allow them to meet their high repayment obligations..179
Conversely, human capital contracts allow students greater employment
options because repayment obligations are reasonable in proportion to their
income, and because no fixed repayment fee is set.180
171. Palacios, supra note 71, at 8–9.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 7.
175. Id.
176. Id. (emphasis in original).
177. See Cutler, supra note 152.
178. Nerlove, supra note 97.
A provision is invariably made for the borrower to ‘opt out’ of the plan, that is, to
terminate his obligation ahead of his repayment cohort, by paying a penalty of some
sort for the privilege. The opt-out provision may be expressed in a variety of equivalent
ways. For example, in the Yale Tuition Postponement Option, repayment at a rate of
interest applied to the balance outstanding of the loan of any cohort member is applied
instead to 150 percent of the loan . . . it is merely repayment of principal at a higher
interest rate of interest than that charged [to] the cohort generally.
Id.
179. Bornstein, supra note 86.
180. Id. Bornstein writes,
[t]he essence of servitude is a loss of freedom. What happens today for many college
students who take on student debt is that they get locked into high payments that limit
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An additional challenge facing the enforcement of human capital
financing in higher education is the risk that such contracts will be
inaccurately priced,” 181 giving rise to “adverse selection.” 182 Palacios
describes the adverse selection problem as arising when investors
mistakenly place higher estimated value on students’ future earnings or
when investors mistakenly lower their expectations of students’ future
earnings, because of inadequate information. 183 Where contracts are
mistakenly priced too highly, students will seek alternative means of
funding, thus leaving investors to adversely select “less profitable”
contracts.184 In order to avoid the adverse selection problem, investors must
carefully analyze the information available to them regarding a student, the
chosen academic institution, and the declared area of study, in order to most
appropriately and reasonably price contracts.185 If contracts are reasonably
priced for potential high-income earners and low-income earners alike,
students and investors will find human capital contracts attractive. 186
Accurately pricing human capital contracts is imperative to the instruments’
economic success, for human capital contracts “work best to finance
education where there is some predictability about students’ future salaries.
The salaries don’t have to be high, just reasonably predictable.”187 While
adequately pricing human capital contracts remains a challenge to investors,
the potential economic returns on future earnings have been thoroughly
analyzed, and provide a useful paradigm from which investors can design
the contracts.
The final challenge facing the enforcement of human capital contracts
in higher education financing is that it requires an audit of the economic
values of different areas of study and academic institutions. In order to do
provide a comprehensive audit, investors must develop systematic
algorithms to accurately predict potential future earnings, as well as reliable
metrics with which to measure the economic value of academic areas of
study and academic intuitions. Evaluating the market price of an education
their career options. With human capital contacts, students would have wider options.
They would know that, regardless of their career choices, their payments would not be
unmanageable.
Id.
181. Id.
182. Palacios, supra note 71, at 9.
183. Id.
184. Id. See also Bornstein, supra note 86. (Human capital contracts “are priced based on
projections of a student’s future earnings—drawing in part on information that students provide
themselves. For obvious reasons, students who say they want to go into banking will be asked to
pay a lower percentage of future income than students who say they want to go into teaching. But
what is to stop a student who secretly wants to become a teacher from pretending that he wants to
become a banker?”).
185. Palacios, supra note 71, at 9.
186. Id.
187. See Bornstein, supra note 86.
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will undoubtedly raise sociopolitical and socioeconomic objections. As
noted earlier, companies such as Lumni enlist an algorithmic model in order
to predict future income to reasonably price human capital contracts.188
Analysts consider factors including school(s) attended, area of study,
employment rates of recent graduates, among others, in determining the
value of an investment contract. Although it is impossible to predict an
individual’s future earning capacity with 100% accuracy, investors can
protect themselves from calculation imperfections by diversifying their
human capital portfolios. In other companies, including Upstart and Pave,
investors can negotiate with candidates on the terms of the financing
agreements in order to create fair investment contracts.
Many critics of human capital contracts in higher education financing
argue that certain areas of study would be considered less valuable, and
would therefore be pursued significantly less than other areas of study with
more lucrative earning potentials. Critics maintain that if “it is in society’s
interest to have individuals pursue fields of study that do not typically yield
high monetary rewards,” then human capital contracts would disincentivize
students from pursuing society’s interests. 189 However, recent surveys
indicate that students are already increasingly pursuing areas of study that
provide the highest earning potential. In fact, some commentators have
likened parents maneuvering their children through the college-application
process to venture capitalists, because like venture capitalists, parents must
calculate the potential earnings returns balanced against the associated
costs.190 Increasingly, public and private sector markets encourage students
to pursue specialized fields of study.191 For example, students who major in
business outnumber those who major in the liberal arts by two to one.192
According to one study, of the Bachelor’s degrees awarded in the 2010-
2011 academic year, the three most popular fields of study were (1)
business, (2) social sciences, and (3) health professions and related
programs.193 This preferential order reflects the potential earning capacity
calculated for each area of study and illustrates that students, and their
parents, consider future earnings in deciding which academic majors to
pursue.
According to the Georgetown University Center on Education and the
Workforce, college students should consider the risk of unemployment
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among recent graduates among different areas of study in deciding their
majors.194 Unemployment rates are highest among non-technical majors,
including liberal arts, social sciences, and humanities. 195 Conversely,
students majoring in education, healthcare, and business enjoy the lowest
unemployment rates. 196 Results from a national survey indicated that the
majors with the highest unemployment rates included political science,
film/video/photography arts, and anthropology.197 Majors with the lowest
unemployment rate included nursing, chemistry, and finance. 198
Additionally, a recent analysis identified the world’s top universities for
producing millionaires.199 This reflects the notion that students and their
parents already consider the economic value of pursuing a particular area of
study at a particular academic institution when deciding what school to go
to and what major to study.
In providing information on the economic value of certain areas of
studies and academic institutions, investors will create greater transparency
in the higher education market. If students have information about the
economic returns on investment in education, they will be more able to
determine what majors to pursue and what schools to attend, in order to
maximize their chances of securing employment and an acceptable return
on their investment. As a result, academic institutions would feel compelled
to more appropriately price tuition such that tuition cost adequately reflects
its true economic value. Furthermore, information on the economic value of
certain majors and universities will create far greater transparency within
the higher education market. Some commentators argue that investing in
students who pursue employment in particular markets increases the supply
of potential professionals within that market.200 Once access to information
regarding employment demand is public, students will pursue the fields of
study most demanded, leading to explosive growth in the supply. 201
However, oversupply of potential employees within desirable fields should
not deter investment in particular fields of study; absent the dissolution of a
particular market, some employment in those sectors should be required.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, human capital contracts ought to be treated as securities
and afforded full legal recognition, in order to provide equity-like financing
to students. Legal recognition of human equity investment, coupled with its
great potential for financial return, will encourage investors to invest in
human capital. Greater investment in human capital will provide a superior
higher education financing scheme for students who do not otherwise have
the required resources. Equity financing in human capital will better serve
the needs of students in today’s volatile economic climate, because students
will not be bound by fixed loan repayment obligations, but rather will enjoy
flexible, income-contingent fee schedules, personally tailored to their
specific earning potentials. Through this arrangement, students will have far
greater freedom to pursue employment opportunities than is currently
afforded. In providing economic valuation analyses on different areas of
study and academic institutions, private equity investment in human capital
will provide greater transparency in the higher education market, which will
enable students to better determine for themselves which majors to pursue
and which academic institutions to attend.
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